# Railway Safety Performance in the European Union 



European Railway
Agency


# Railway Safety Performance in the European Union 

## 2010



Foreword

This is the third report that the Agency has published on the development of railway safety in Europe. The editing was finished only a few weeks after the train collision in Buizingen near Halle in Belgium on 15 February 2010. As a matter of fact, we have had two major serious accidents in Europe in less than a year - in Viareggio in June 2009 and the recent one in Buizingen. Around 50 people have been killed in the two accidents and numerous persons have been seriously injured. This reminds us that rail transport is a risky activity and that all possible diligence must be exercised to try to avoid accidents like these. The investigation reports are still not available and it would be premature to draw conclusions on the causes of the accidents.

There are, however, some similarities between the two accidents which raise concern about how safety is managed by railway operators in Europe. In both accident cases the chief executive officers (CEOs) of the railway undertakings and infrastructure managers involved did not stand up and take responsibility. Instead we had to witness a shameful and degrading play in front of media and victims where CEOs tried to put the blame on someone else and even (in the last case) tried to pass responsibility to the European Commission.

Experience shows that catastrophes, like the Viareggio and Buizingen accidents, never have a single and simple cause. There is always a complex chain of events and deficiencies that lead to these kinds of accidents. Causes can almost always be traced back to managerial, organisational and human interface factors. A catastrophe is an accident of the organisation. In addition, there are always precursors that, correctly interpreted, should have rung the alarm bell to the management, if it takes care to properly manage safety.

The Railway Safety Directive (2004/49/EC) requires railway undertakings and infrastructure managers to implement a safety management system - actually a pre-condition to obtain a certificate to operate. The key element of such a safety management system is always the commitment from top management, in particular the CEO. He or she must understand that responsibility for managing safety remains at the top level of the company and that it cannot be passed on to operational staff or contractors. If this commitment does not exist the safety management system is more or less void and merely a binder of documents.

Further on in the report the reader may find more information about the concept of safety management and the proposals developed by the Agency to arrive at a common approach to assessment of the safety management systems.


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## Summary, commentary and analysis



## The development of safety

Railways remain a safe form of transport but further analysis of trends based on common safety indicator (CSI) data cannot be done yet. Even though both the number of accidents and the total number of fatalities fell compared to 2007, there are still a substantial number of unauthorised persons and level crossing users killed and the total reported number of fatalities was higher than in 2006.

The national investigation bodies (NIBs) have notified the Agency of 146 accidents that occurred during 2009. The Agency also received 210 investigation reports during 2009 covering accidents dating from 2006 and onwards. In January 2010, the Agency set up a safety information system which enables the Member States and the industry to disseminate information on safety-critical issues.

The issuing of safety certificates according to the Railway Safety Directive is not proceeding as expected. A review of the annual reports from the national safety authorities (NSAs) shows that a number of countries have not yet issued any certificates and some use a combination of the new and old legislation. The use of dual or old legislation will not be possible as from 1 January 2011, when all railway undertakings (RUs) are required to have a certificate issued according to the Railway Safety Directive.

The Agency has concerns as to whether all pending applications for safety certificates will be processed in time before the deadline of 1 January 2011. Up until now, over 300 certificates have been issued. There are, though, three Member States that have not yet issued any part A certificates and that have a large number of pending applications.

Transparency of national safety rules, particularly during this period of change towards the open market, is one of the key conditions for safe operation of the railways. The Agency has evaluated how some of the requirements contributing to transparency of the rules have been implemented in the Member States. We have concluded that a more systematic and common approach is necessary to ensure the comprehensiveness of the national systems of safety rules and their accessibility.

During 2009 the Agency made available a historical archive of fatal accidents in Europe. The accident data were collected in a research project and the information is stored in our database. The archive contains data on 384 serious accidents which occurred between 1990 and 2005. In this report we present the archive and some of the trends that emerge from the data.

## The risk profile of the railways

The railways are generally safe for passengers and employees and this is confirmed by the 2008 data. Single fatality accidents, i.e. unauthorised persons being hit by rolling stock in motion or level crossing accidents, form the major part of the number of fatalities. Railway accidents, collisions, derailments and fires, only cause less than $2 \%$ of the fatalities.

The total number of passengers killed for the period 2006-2008 is 243 , a comparatively small figure compared to the total number
of 4472 persons killed ( ${ }^{1}$ ). Most of the passenger fatalities occur when passengers try to embark or disembark trains that are moving. However, there were a number of serious accidents in 2008 that caused a larger number of passenger fatalities. The accidents are described on page 28. The fluctuations in reported number of level crossing fatalities and unauthorised persons killed can be explained by changes in how the Member States classify the victims. Viewed together, the reported numbers are at a stable level during the mentioned period.

Chart 1. Fatalities on European railways 2006-2008


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## Level crossing accidents

The number of level crossing accidents constitutes a substantial share of the total number of accidents. The NSAs have reported a total of 3774 level crossing accidents and 1287 level crossing users killed during the three years 2006-2008.

The reported total number of level crossings fell by 6 \% from 2006 to 2007; however, there is a less than $1 \%$ reduction between 2007 and 2008. This indicates changes in reporting procedures and that the figures are not yet fully reliable. The total number of level crossings was over 125000 for 2008. There is a potential for reductions in the number of fatalities through structured and focused work with level crossing safety.


## Suicides on railway premises

The majority of fatalities in the railway system are suicides. The consequences are not only trauma for the other parties involved, but also significant for the cost of delays and costs to the rescue services, police investigations, etc. There is a need for a discussion on the possibilities of reducing the numbers through preventative measures.

Media attention and reporting can adversely affect the number of suicides. As an example, Chart 2 shows the number of suicides per six months in a metro in Austria, where an agreement with the local media dramatically reduced suicides. The number of suicides dropped immediately after the agreement (the red line) and stabilised on a third of the number before the agreement $\left(^{(2)}\right.$. This is the so-called 'Werther effect' ${ }^{(3)}$ and has been shown in several studies. Further, there are indications that simple measures, such as increased lighting in station areas can have a significant effect on reducing the number of suicides ${ }^{(4)}$.

The railways face an even more difficult problem than the metros because of the size of the network. However, identification of 'hotspots' has proved possible. Some studies indicate that up to $75 \%$ of all suicides occur in the vicinity of psychiatric institutions, and measures such as fencing etc. in strategic places can prove effective.

[^1]Chart 2. Number of suicides before and after an agreement with local media. Example from Austria.


A research project on suicides and trespasser fatalities is expected to be included in the seventh framework programme ( ${ }^{5}$ ). This project will be supported by the Agency and will aim at identifying the practices that could be applied to introduce mitigation
measures of different kinds, analyse them and identify the most effective and cost-efficient counteractions to prevent suicides and trespasser fatalities.

[^2]

## Safety performance

## Reporting of accident statistics and indicators

The third set of common safety indicators (CSIs) was largely reported on time and with less need for corrections than previous years' submissions.

The common safety indicators to be reported to the Agency are laid down in Annex I to the Railway Safety Directive with definitions to be found in the Eurostat regulation. Member States are also required to report accident data to Eurostat.

## Revision of Annex I to the Railway Safety Directive

## Safety reporting and

 coordination
## Accident statistics

Railway accidents and incidents reporting is required in two separate EU legislative acts.

- The Eurostat regulation ((EC) No 2003/91) requires reporting data to Eurostat.
- The Railway Safety Directive (2004/49/EC) requires reporting data to the Railway Agency.

The Railway Safety Directive requires the NSAs to report significant accidents as defined in Regulation (EC) No 2003/91. According to this regulation, the Member States may use national definitions of the indicators during the first five years.
'"Significant accident" means any accident involving at least one rail vehicle in motion, resulting in at least one killed or seriously injured person, or in significant damage to stock, track, other installations or environment, or extensive disruptions to traffic. Accidents in workshops, warehouses and depots are excluded' (91/2003/EC).

## Data quality

The work on improving data quality has continued using the same approach developed for the previous years' submissions. All the indicators have been checked for consistency and fluctuation, and a comparison with the Eurostat data has been carried out. There are continuous improvements in data quality; this year it has also been possible to update the data reported in previous years. Therefore, the CSI tables in the annex to this report replace the tables published in previous reports.

## Serious accidents

## Reporting of serious accidents and accident investigations

Independent accident investigation is a key element of learning lessons from accidents and incidents. Even though all Member States except one have established an independent investigation body, the Agency still has concerns as to whether the organisation and the procedures in some Member States comply with the requirements of the directive.

The Railway Safety Directive requires the Member States to set up an independent accident investigation body that shall notify the Agency of any investigations opened as well as to send the full investigation report when the investigation is closed. In 2009, the national investigation bodies notified the Agency of 190 investigations opened and submitted 210 investigation reports. The information is publicly available in the Agency's database ERADIS.

## National investigation bodies

According to Article 21 of the Railway Safety Directive, each Member State is required to set up a permanent investigation body with responsibility for investigating serious accidents and incidents.

The NIBs should investigate serious accidents, defined as an accident with at least one fatality, or five seriously injured persons, or with an immediate estimated monetary cost of at least EUR 2 million.

The investigation bodies should notify the Agency within one week of the opening of an investigation into a serious accident and should send a full investigation report normally within one year, after the occurrence of a serious accident.

The accident report should 'contain, where appropriate, safety recommendations'. The recommendations should be addressed to the safety authorities, which must report back to the investigation body on actions taken.


## Safety performance

## Accident types

Accidents to persons caused by rolling stock in motion and level crossing accidents constitute around $75 \%$ of the total number of accidents on the railways, suicides excluded ( ${ }^{6}$ ). The graph below presents the number of accidents per accident type. The emerging pattern, a big decrease in the reported number of accidents from 2006 to 2007, can be explained by the reporting of two countries.

Germany reported all collisions of trains in 2006, because significant accidents could not be extracted. Similarly, Bulgaria reported all accidents in 2006, specifically 1630 'Other' accidents. Excluding these non-significant Bulgarian 'Other' accidents and the German collisions from the dataset, gives 4726 accidents in 2006 in total; this is closer to the totals for 2007 and 2008.

The chart illustrates that the reporting was developing in 2006 and that it takes time to establish a reporting regime. The situation had improved in 2007 and was confirmed by the figures reported for 2008.

Chart 3. Reported number of accidents per accident type 2006-2008


## Fatalities and injuries

The majority of the reported fatalities are for unauthorised persons and level crossing users. The most common type of accident is trespassers hit by rolling stock in motion. Passenger fatalities account for only $5 \%$ of the total number of deaths.

In Chart 5, showing the reported number of fatalities per victim type and year, there are big fluctuations in the reported numbers for fatalities to level crossing users and unauthorised persons. However, by adding together the number of level crossing fatalities and fatalities of unauthorised persons, year by year, we obtain a series of 1306,1271 and 1275 , which are remarkably stable figures. This clearly indicates that the Member States are still in a learning process on how to classify fatalities and it is probable that this applies

[^3]for all indicators. The total number of employee fatalities has remained at 38 for all three years. This is a coincidence as there is some variation in the figures reported by the Member States, as can be seen in Table 1 in Annex 1.

Chart 4. Fatalities per victim type 2006-2008


Chart 5. Reported number of fatalities per victim type 2006-2008


A number of NSAs have reported changes in reporting procedures or definitions applied in the data collection. This can also be seen in Chart 6. For serious injuries, the reported numbers of injured passengers and unauthorised persons show large variations beyond what might be expected from natural fluctuation.

The graph shows a rather large drop in the number of passenger injuries from 2006 to 2007. There is no single value that can explain this, a number of countries have reported a reduction in the number of passenger injuries that together account for the total reduction. The majority of the countries show variation in the reporting for 2006-2008 for all victim types. A better understanding of the trends and patterns will come when the 2009 data is reported.

Chart 6. Reported number of serious injuries per victim type 2006-2008


## Suicides

Suicides are reported separately from accident fatalities. Suicides represent $62 \%$ of the casualties and, together with the unauthorised persons, constitute $83 \%$ of the fatalities occurring within the railway system. The Member States use different ways of classifying the fatalities. The revised Annex 1 and its guidance will lead to a more harmonised approach to classifying suicides.

Chart 7. Suicides and total deaths 2006-2008


## Precursors to accidents

'Precursors to accidents' refers to indicators measuring incidents that under other circumstances would have led to an accident. There are indicators for broken rails, track buckles, signals passed at danger, wrong-side signalling failures, broken wheels and broken axles.

The reported number of track buckles has reduced from 7803 in 2006 to 835 in 2008, and the reported number of signals passed at danger (SPADs) has increased threefold. The differences are mainly accounted for by Italy and Poland which have changed definitions during the period, as is apparent in Table 1.

Following the accident in Viareggio in Italy in 2009, the Agency has established a task force on freight wagon maintenance in cooperation with the Member States. Among the objectives of the task force are the review, exchange and analysis of information relating to problems with broken axles/fatigue and

|  | IT <br> Track buckles | PL <br> SPADs |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2006 | 6743 | No data |
| 2007 | 3113 | 4113 |
| 2008 | 41 | 2653 |

Table 1. Italian track buckles and Polish SPADs 2006-2008 relevant testing methods, the proposal or development of appropriate controls and monitoring tools, the proposal of measures to review the different maintenance regimes existing across Europe and the drawing up of a programme for further harmonisation. Within this scope, the Agency has also conducted a survey among the NSAs on the number of broken axles and wheels. The aim of the survey was to review the figures reported to the Agency and the definitions used. The survey showed that most NSAs only reported cracks in wheels and axles that led to an accident. Only one country, Germany, included cracks detected during regular maintenance, which is in accordance with the guidance for the revised Annex I to the Railway Safety Directive. Germany reported three cracks that led to accidents in 2008, and a total of 752 cracks. This means that the figures reported for broken wheels and axles, displayed in Chart 8, only show a part of the situation. The survey also showed that problems with hot boxes are of more concern than cracks in wheels and axles.

Chart 8. Precursors to accidents


## Accident costs and other CSIs

The data on the cost of accidents show wide variation and it is evident to the Agency that the Member States have problems in establishing reporting regimes for accident cost data. The revised Annex I to the Railway Safety Directive will require the NSAs to use the willingness-to-pay approach using estimates of the Value for Preventing a Fatality (VPF). They can either estimate a national value or use the reference values given in the Agency's guidance. It is foreseen that this will simplify the work for the Member States and will lead to a consistent and harmonised approach. The Agency will start analysing data on the cost of accidents starting when the 2010 accident indicators are submitted.

## Infrastructure

## Automatic train protection

## Definition:

'Automatic Train Protection (ATP)' means a system that enforces obedience to signals and speed restrictions by speed supervision, including automatic stop at signals.

## Guidance:

Systems where track signalling information is substituted and/or supplemented by cab signalling are included.

The part of the definition relating to 'automatic stop at signals' is intended to include also automatic stops at conflict points between clearance gauges.

Three CSIs concern railway infrastructure, one is a measure of the coverage of automatic train protection systems on the lines; the other is the number of level crossings, normalised by the length of the network expressed in track km and the third gives information on the level of protection at level crossings.

Chart 9. Percentage of tracks equipped with automatic train protection (ATP) ( ${ }^{7}$ )


[^4]Chart 10. Number of level crossings per track km 2006-2008 ( ${ }^{8}$ )

${ }^{(8)} \mathrm{CT}$ is the abbreviation for Channel Tunnel.

Chart 11. Percentage of level crossings with automatic or manual protection ( ${ }^{9}$ )


[^5]
## Traffic volumes

Chart 12. Number of million passenger kilometres $\left({ }^{10}\right)$

( ${ }^{10}$ ) CT is the abbreviation for Channel Tunnel.

Chart 13. Number of million train km ( ${ }^{11}$ )


## Serious accidents in Europe

## Reporting by the investigation bodies

The Agency's public database of safety documents includes notifications of investigations and reports submitted by the investigation bodies.

Chart 14 shows the trend in the submissions of notifications and investigation reports. Even though the majority of the investigation reports are submitted within one year it is also clear that a substantial number of investigations take a longer time. At the end of 2009 there were still 157 open investigations for accidents that occurred 2006-2008, which shows that the final reports for $28 \%$ of all investigations were not submitted within 12 months. Some Member States report a lack of resources as the main reason for not being able to finish all the notified investigations.

Chart 14. Open and completed investigations 2007-2009


The chart also shows that not all accident investigations are notified to the Agency within a week. The Railway Safety Directive requires the NIBs to notify the Agency of opened investigations within one week of opening an investigation. Looking only at the notifications submitted during 2009, the pattern becomes even more visible.

Chart 15 shows the time span between occurrence and notification. Some 48 of the 190 notifications received in 2009 referred to investigations of accidents that occurred 2008 or earlier. The Agency will look further into this and the reporting procedures of the NIBS.

## NIB annual reports

The annual reports submitted by the NIBs show large variation in the activities of the investigation bodies. The Agency received 23 annual reports for 2008. The number of investigations opened during 2008 varies from 0 to over 50 , and the number of recommendations issued from 0 to over 180 .

## Historical archive of accidents

In a research project the Agency has collected data on serious accidents for the period 1990-2007. The accident archive is publicly available in our database, accessible through the Agency's website at the following address: http://pdb.era.europa.eu. The criterion for including an accident in the archive was the definition of a serious accident, as given in the Railway Safety Directive. For the purpose of the project, a list of specific scenarios for inclusion or exclusion of accidents was set up.

The project identified 402 accidents, of which 382 were not previously known to ERA. The initial list of accidents was set up through a media and news report search. The list was then completed and verified by the National Investigation Bodies. Regarding the completeness of the data, the project concluded that the coverage and accuracy of data was satisfactory for the following accident types:

- Fatal train collisions, derailments and fires.
- Level crossing accidents with on-train fatalities.
- Other accidents with four or more fatalities.

Table 2 lists all rail accidents in Europe with 15 or more fatalities since 1990.
In Annex 2 there is a list of all accidents with five or more fatalities.

Chart 15. Time span between accident occurrence and notification submitted to the Agency. Notifications submitted during 2009.

< 1 week
21 \%
< 1 month and $>1$ week $23 \%$
< 6 months and $>1$ month 42 \%
$>6$ months $\quad 15 \%$

| Date | Country | Place | Type | Fatalities | Injuries |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| $02 / 02 / 1990$ | DE | Rüsselsheim station | Train collision | 17 | 37 |
| $21 / 08 / 1990$ | PL | Wlochy | Train collision | 16 | 42 |
| $17 / 10 / 1991$ | FR | Melun Station, near Paris | Train collision | 16 | 50 |
| $26 / 09 / 1992$ | HU | Agárd, Gárrdony | LC accident | 16 | 0 |
| $02 / 12 / 1994$ | HU | Szajol station | Derailment | 31 | 54 |
| $24 / 06 / 1995$ | CZ | Krouna | Train collision | 19 | 4 |
| $31 / 03 / 1997$ | ES | Uharte Arakil station, Navarra | Derailment | 18 | 40 |
| $03 / 06 / 1998$ | DE | Eschede | Derailment | 101 | 87 |
| $05 / 10 / 1999$ | UK | Ladbroke Grove, London | Train collision | 31 | 227 |
| $04 / 01 / 2000$ | NO | Asta | Train collision | 19 | 18 |
| $08 / 05 / 2003$ | HU | Lake Balaton | LC accident | 33 | 7 |
| $03 / 06 / 2003$ | ES | Chinchilla/Navajuelos | Train collision | 19 | 6 |
| $07 / 01 / 2005$ | IT | Bolognina diCrevalcore | Train collision | 17 | 15 |
| $29 / 06 / 2009$ | IT | Viareggio | Derailment | 32 | 27 |
| $15 / 02 / 2010$ | BE | Buizingen station | Train collision | 18 | 83 (*) $^{4}$ |

Table 2. Accidents in Europe with more than 15 fatalities since 1990. Source: ERA historical archive of railway accidents, notifications submitted by NIBs and other sources.
${ }^{(*)}$ The number of fatalities and serious injuries in the Halle accident as per 19 March 2010. Figures can change. LC accident means Level crossing accident.

There are several ways to analyse the data. Chart 16 shows the number of fatal accidents with at least five fatalities and the number of fatalities in these accidents. There is a slight downward trend in the number of fatal accidents per year.

Chart 16. Fatal train accidents with five or more fatalities 1990-2009. Source: ERA Accident Archive combined with ERADIS database containing accident notifications submitted by the national investigation bodies.


The outcome, the number of fatalities per year, does not show the same trend. The accidents in Eschede, Germany, in 1998, with 101 fatalities, and the Viareggio accident in Italy in 2009, with 32 fatalities, have obvious clear impact on the totals for those years.

## Accidents in Europe

Each year a number of very serious accidents with passenger or train crew fatalities occur. This section contains descriptions of a selection of accidents and events that have been exceptionally severe or that have implications for the management of safety and contains information that is of interest on a European level. More information about the accidents can be found in the Agency's database at the web address http://pdb.era.europa.eu.

## Zoufftgen accident, France

On 11 October 2006, a freight train and a regional express train collided head-on on the border between France and Luxembourg, near Zoufftgen. In February 2009, the final report on the train collision was published. The accident led to the death of six people, one seriously injured person and 15 lightly injured persons.

At the time, only one of the two tracks was used because of maintenance work. The investigation showed that the direct cause of the accident was communications error: 'the Traffic Controller of the Bettembourg Central Control Post mistakenly issued the driver of the RET an order to pass through the "danger" signal protecting the section of track on which the freight train was travelling' $\left({ }^{12}\right)$. A number of underlying causes for this error were identified.

The investigation led to 22 recommendations addressing a range of issues; regulations and routines for staff in command control centres, communication and warning equipment and procedures which focus on cross-border aspects; as well as more technical aspects such as faults in signalling equipment.

## Passenger train fire, Bulgaria

Nine passengers were killed and 10 were seriously injured when a sleeping coach caught fire on 28 February 2008 on the line between the railway stations Kunino and Cherven Briyag. Train staff tried to evacuate passengers and fight the fire using on-board extinguishers, the train was stopped on the line and unsuccessful attempts were made to disconnect the coach on fire from the rest of the train.

The investigation conducted by the Bulgarian NIB concluded that the fire was caused by an electrical failure in the lighting of one of the compartments. This resulted in sparking and intensive heat, which destroyed the insulation material in the roof of the coach and produced a flammable gas which ignited and exploded, and led to the fire in the compartment.


Image 2. Passenger train fire, Bulgaria, 28 February 2008.
Photo: Bulgarian NIB

[^6]
## Collision with sheep and derailment, Germany

On 26 April 2008, 22 people were seriously injured when a high speed passenger train hit a herd of sheep at the entrance to the Landrücken tunnel south of Fulda, and subsequently derailed and impacted against the tunnel walls.

The German investigation body issued recommendations on aspects of the design of high speed trains, communication during operation and between the railway undertaking, infrastructure manager and the rescue services.

## Bridge collapse, Czech Republic

On 8 August 2008 a motorway road bridge above the Studenka station collapsed just in front of an approaching Eurocity train travelling at $134 \mathrm{~km} / \mathrm{h}$. An emergency braking by the driver reduced the speed to $90 \mathrm{~km} / \mathrm{h}$. The train collided with the ruins of the bridge and derailed. Derailed carriages consequently collided with an infrastructure works train waiting in the station. The accident led to seven fatalities and 88 injuries. An eighth victim subsequently died two months later. The total damage is estimated to have been around EUR 2.5 million. The bridge was undergoing repairs and the investigation showed that regulations were not observed by the construction company.


Image 3. Bridge collapse, Czech republic, 8 August 2008. Photo: Czech NIB

## Tunnel fire, Channel Tunnel

A road vehicle on a shuttle train caught fire during transit through the Channel Tunnel on 11 September 2008. The train crew and passengers escaped to a safe place in the adjacent service tunnel and there were no injuries. The material damage was substantial as the fire spread to all 27 vehicles on the shuttle, damaging both the tunnel infrastructure and the train.

The French national investigation body has conducted an accident investigation, however, no investigation report has been released at the time of editing this report.

## Train collision, Hungary

A failure of the signal system on a line between Pilis and Monor stations on 6 October 2008 led to a collision between an intercity train and a regional passenger train. The intercity train left the Pilis station first and travelled at $15 \mathrm{~km} / \mathrm{hour}$. In the following regional passenger train, the driver did not follow the rules to run at the permitted speed, and accelerated the train to $100 \mathrm{~km} /$ hour. Since the interlocking system was out of order and the automatic train protection was inactivated, the passenger train ran into the end of the intercity train and collided at a speed of 71 km/hour. The collision caused four passenger fatalities and four persons were seriously injured.


Image 4. Train collision, Hungary, 6 October 2008.
Photo: Hungarian NIB

Derailment and dangerous goods accident, Viareggio, Italy

Some 32 persons were killed and 27 persons seriously injured by a gas explosion when a freight train derailed in Viareggio in northern Italy on Monday, 29 June 2009. The accident occurred at 23.48 local time on the approach to Viareggio Station.

The train involved in the accident consisted of 14 tank wagons that carried liquefied petroleum gas (LPG). Following the derailment, one of the wagons was punctured, gas leaked out and, after a few minutes the gas cloud, which spread out over the station and a nearby street, exploded causing severe damage to the station and the houses and leading to fatalities in the surroundings.

The preliminary investigation showed that the cause of the accident was a broken axle on one of the overturned cars. The accident investigation opened by the Italian investigation body is to be completed by mid-2010.

Image 5. Freight train derailment, Viareggio, Italy 29 June 2009.


## Bridge collapse, Ireland

At 18.07 on 21 August 2009, a train driver, travelling between Donabate and Malahide Stations over the Broadmeadow Estuary in north County Dublin, reported a partial collapse of the Malahide viaduct. The viaduct is a 176 -metre wide structure, with 11 stone masonry piers, which support a pre-stressed, precast concrete deck.

The train driver immediately called the signaller, who isolated the track section on the viaduct and stopped all train services travelling over the viaduct. A rock causeway runs between the piers of the viaduct mitigating the effects of tidal flow on the viaduct. When the Irish investigation body arrived at the site, one of the middle supporting masonry piers of the viaduct had crumbled, causing a 20-metre section of the deck (track, sleepers and ballast) to collapse.

Initial investigations of the viaduct structure indicate that scour undermining of the pier was a causal factor to the accident. The investigation body is continuing its investigations and a report on the accident is expected to be released within one year.

Image 6. Bridge collapse at Malahide, Ireland, 21 August 2009. Photo: Irish NIB


## Suicides, Germany

On 10 November 2009, a well-known German football goalkeeper committed suicide by throwing himself in front of a train. This event triggered a wave of suicides, significantly increasing the number of suicides on the railways in the weeks following the incident $\left({ }^{13}\right)$. It is a well-known fact that tragic events like this lead to an increase in suicides. The German railways had previously managed to bring down the number of suicides, partly as a result of agreements with the press not to publish information on suicides. However, in a case like this, media attention and publicity were unavoidable and the following increase in suicides inevitable.

## Train collision, Belgium

In the morning rush hour of 15 February 2010, two passenger trains collided at Buizingen station, 2 km north of Halle in Belgium. The accident forced one train to plough deep into the front carriage of the other, ripping open and totally destroying another carriage. There were some 300 passengers on the two trains and the accident caused the death of 19 people and a total of 171 injured.

The devastation at the accident scene was enormous and there was also substantial damage to the overhead power lines, as two of the carriages were forced up into the air by the collision.

The Belgian investigation body has started an investigation into the causes of the accident.


Image 7. Train collision at Buizingen station, Belgium, 15 February 2010. Photo: Belgian NIB

[^7]
## Managing safety

## Assessing safety management systems

The Railway Safety Directive requires national safety authorities to assess the safety management systems of railway undertakings and infrastructure managers. If the SMS meets requirements set out in the Railway Safety Directive the NSA can issue a safety certificate to a RU or an authorisation to an infrastructure manager. This is known as part A certification. The part B certificate is the network-specific requirements relating to the infrastructure and/or the vehicles used and operated. Part A certificates for railway undertakings are valid throughout the EU whereas the RUs will need to obtain a Part B certificate for each Member State that they operate in.

The Agency issued draft assessment criteria in 2007 for NSAs to use when assessing the safety management system relevant for the part A certificate. The criteria, that together with a set of principles for both the assessment process and the supervision regime form the common safety method on conformity assessment (CSM on CA), is due to become a regulation in 2010. The use of this method will help to ensure trust between Member States, assist railway undertakings to gain access to networks in different Member States and form a first step in the migration towards a single certificate.

## Safety management systems

A safety management system (SMS) is a documented process for managing risks and it integrates the operation of the railway, the vehicles and the infrastructure.

It is an important way of demonstrating that railway undertakings and infrastructure managers are operating and maintaining their part of the railway systems.

A harmonisation of the assessment of SMS ensures that the market is open and competitive because each Member State will be adopting a consistent and transparent process for managing safety.


## Safety certificates issued

Up until now, 19 NSAs have used the Railway Safety Directive to award certificates. The rest are either using the provisions of previous legislation (Directive 2001/14) or a combination. NSAs have until 1 January 2011 before they are required to issue certificates and authorisations according to the Railway Safety Directive. A review of the NSA annual reports also shows that only three countries, Czech Republic, France and Norway, have issued part B certificates for a RU from another country, six certificates in total.

| No |  | Have | Part A certificates |  | Part B certificates |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  |  |  | Issued | Pending | Issued | Pending |
| 19 | NSAs | Used RSD 2004/49 to issue certificates | 337 | 50 | (*) | 70 |
| 2 | NSAs | Used RSD 2004/49 to issue certificates but did not notify the Agency | 4 | 12 | 1 | 14 |
| 3 | NSAs | Have applications for certificates but not issued any | 0 | 45 | 0 | 56 |
| Total |  |  | 341 | 57 | (*) | 140 |

Table 3. Safety certificates issued and pending. Source: ERA database ERADIS and NSA Annual reports. Data as per 30 January 2010.
${ }^{(*)}$ The Agency has no reliable information in its database on the number of part B certificates issued. There is no requirement to notify the Agency when a part B certificate is issued.

The Agency has concerns that those Member States that have not yet issued certificates according to the Railway Safety Directive, Germany, Italy and Greece, will not be able to issue certificates on time. If this is not achieved by the end of 2010, the railway undertakings in these countries will not be able to provide any service.

## Common safety targets

Common safety targets are quantitative tools intended to monitor that current safety levels of the railways in the Member States are at least maintained. In the long term, they are also intended to help in reducing the current differences in safety performance.

In 2009, a Commission Decision (2009/460/EC) entered into force and established a method for calculating common safety targets (CSTs) and national reference values (NRVs). During the year, the Agency completed the work with Eurostat to increase data quality and correct errors in the reporting.

The first set of CSTs and NRVs was calculated, based on Eurostat data, and was included in a recommendation delivered to the Commission in September 2009 and was published in the Official Journal on 22 July 2010 as Commission Decision 2010/409/EC.

In the first half of 2010, the Agency will carry out the first assessment of achievement of the first set of CSTs, based on four-year time series of Eurostat data on railway accidents, covering the period 2005-08.

## Safety regulation

In several Member States, the safety regulatory framework is still undergoing significant development. The Agency has begun an evaluation of the national measures implementing the Railway Safety Directive in the Member States at the request of the Commission. The Agency also evaluates the notifications and registers the rules in the Agency's public database, which now contains the notified rules of most Member States.

The transparency and availability of the national safety rules that should be used by the railway undertakings operating on the railway network is important to the opening up of the market. The Directive requires Member States to notify the Commission of new and amended rules $\left({ }^{14}\right)$. The Commission monitors and reviews the introduction of new national rules. The long-term objective of the Railway Safety Directive is the gradual reduction of national rules in order to move to a more harmonised European approach.

During 2009, the Agency published a report on the evaluation of the way in which national safety rules are published and made available in the Member States $\left({ }^{15}\right)$. The conclusions drawn from the evaluation listed below.

- All notified national safety rules are published and made available, but are not necessarily easy to find.
- The Agency has concerns that the system of national safety rules is not yet comprehensive, as the measures to establish all the safety rules necessary for a safe railway operation have not yet been fully implemented.
- Particular attention should be paid to the infrastructure manager and railway undertaking rules in the development of the national safety regulatory framework as in many Member States there is restricted consultation on the draft rules, and the safety rules are not easily accessible for the stakeholders.
- A more systematic and common approach by the safety authorities is necessary to ensure accessibility to the safety rules for all stakeholders, particularly applicants for safety certification.

On the basis of these conclusions, the Agency has issued a recommendation addressed to the Commission $\left({ }^{16}\right)$.

## Further studies on freight train derailments

In May 2009 the Agency recommended the Commission not to adopt, in Community laws, a new measure for dangerous goods wagons proposed by the RID Committee of Experts. The proposed device, giving a significant share of false alarms, would increase disturbances to freight services, and would also introduce new unsolved problems both in interoperability and safety. The balance between potential advantages and disadvantages was therefore likely to be negative for the overall railway system.

Following extensive discussions, and taking into account the case of rare but potentially catastrophic accidents, EU Member States adopted a Community position agreeing with the Agency's recommendation and considered it necessary to undertake an exhaustive analysis of potential new measures, leading to clear benefits for the railway system. The new scope of analysis covers all freight trains and will allow the Agency to study the best options for preventing derailments or reducing their consequences. The results of the study will be available in 2012.


## Network of safety authorities

A series of peer reviews has taken place, with the purpose of learning and sharing information on the methods used by the safety authorities in assessments of applications for safety certificates. The peer reviews are meetings held with a limited number of authorities where the working methods and process are presented and discussed. The reviews are seen as a good way for creating trust, giving information on the working methods and learning from each other. The network of authorities decided in 2009 to widen the scope of peer reviews to authorisations for placing in service because of the useful results of peer review on safety certification.

[^8]Challenges and changes: the future of railway safety

## Development of safety reporting

The Agency is developing during 2010 the reporting tools for the NSAs and the NIBs. In order to improve data quality and reduce workload for the NSAs and the Agency, an automatic data quality check of CSI data will be developed. Upon upload of CSI data, the NSA will be presented with a data quality report and given a possibility to check and correct their data before submission to the Agency.

Further, a new system for notifications and reporting of accidents will enable a more flexible and rational handling of data, provide added value and functionality for the NIBS and improve the possibilities of dissemination of information for the Agency. A first version of the system will be developed during 2010 and put in service during 2011.

## Development of common safety targets

In 2010 the Agency starts working on the future developments of CSTs and NRVs and will evaluate the possibility of developing NRVs and CSTs also for parts of the railway system as well as for accident precursors. To this end, pilot projects at national level could be launched in this year.

The possibility of using EU funding resources to support the Member States to achieve, in the future, more demanding safety targets, will be evaluated with a view to preparing the ground for the second set of CSTs and NRVs.

## Migration to a single safety certificate

The Agency is, during 2010, evaluating the development of safety certification by the NSAs. The evaluation will form the basis of a recommendation to the Commission on strategies for migration towards a single Community Safety certificate. The single common safety certificate will allow RUs to operate freely across borders using one certificate accepted by all NSAs.

From the information currently available ( ${ }^{17}$ ), it is evident that not all Member States have developed and applied the necessary administrative procedures to ensure an effective application of the Railway Safety Directive. Without these procedures in place it is likely that it will take time for all Member States and NSAs to be on an equal footing. The adoption of the CSM on conformity assessment will help but it is likely that additional elements, like for example the CSM on risk assessment or the development of the certification of the entity in charge of maintenance, will need to be in place before the long-term objective of a fully open and competitive rail market will be achieved. This will come when we have a fully mature and safe railway system which has the SMS at the heart of its operation. The Agency will work together with the European railway actors to achieve this.

## The future role of the Railway Agency

The Agency has played a crucial role in the development of railway safety in Europe following the implementation of the Railway Safety Directive into national legislations. In the beginning, the Agency had more of a regulatory role, producing recommendations to the European Commission. This role has been transformed to assisting the Member States in a number of areas, from establishing the safety authorities and investigation bodies, giving advice in the implementation process of the Railway Safety Directive into national legislation, through setting up networks and establishing reporting procedures and routines, to development of recommendations, guidance, safety targets and safety methods. The role has so far been more focused on helping and supporting the Member States rather than monitoring and controlling.

There is still work to be done and many Member States need help in establishing a safety regime according to the Railway Safety Directive. The Agency believes it to be important to continue the

[^9]current work and have a good working relationship between the Agency and the national bodies and authorities.

However, the role of the Agency will change in the future. With the first set of safety targets to become EU law during this year, and the development of a second, possibly more demanding set under way, the role will change to more of a monitoring role, and this is likely to affect the relationship between the national bodies and authorities and the Agency.

The Agency and the safety authorities have also established a reflection group that, in a series of meetings, will work on the future role of the Agency, of the safety authorities and of the cooperation between the NSAs and the Agency. The reflection group will look at the need for more structured auditing activities as a measure to ensure the correct application of the Railway

Safety Directive by the safety authorities when assessing the safety management systems in the certification processes and by the investigation bodies when investigating serious accidents.

There are also requests for the Agency to take a more active role in certain areas, recently reinforced by the tragic events at Viareggio in Italy and Halle in Belgium. The Agency has provided support to the Italian and Belgian investigation bodies and also, after the Viareggio accident, developed special taskforces for freight wagon maintenance to give a European perspective to the problems.

It will be a challenge for the Agency to manage these partly conflicting requirements in the future. There will be a need for a discussion on the focus of the future role of the Agency and how it can help in the work for a safe and modern European railway.


## Looking forward

The year 2010 promises to be a challenging year for the railway safety sector in Europe. The tragic events in Italy and recently in Belgium are a clear reminder that we cannot lean back and relax. The work for a safe modern and competitive railway sector will continue and accelerate.

In 2010 we will see results of the work in the freight wagon maintenance task force, with possible effects on the procedures and standards for inspection and maintenance of axles. 2010 is also the last year that railway undertakings can provide services under the provisions of previous legislations. From 1 January 2011 all railway undertakings must have a certificate issued under the Railway Safety Directive 2004/39/EC. It will be a challenge for certain Member States to get up to speed with the assessment of RUs applications and issuing certificates. The end goal is a better platform for a migration to a single European certificate and the work will start during this year.

The key issue will be the development of the safety management systems of the railway undertakings and the infrastructure
managers and the NSAs ability to assess and supervise their application. A sound and systematic way of managing risks can be achieved through the establishment of safety management systems that comply with the requirements of the Railway Safety Directive. For many countries, there is a lot of work still to be done.

The revised Annex I to the Railway Safety Directive requires the Member States to comply with harmonised definitions when reporting accident and incident data. This will provide a better platform for understanding trends and patterns in safety performance and will, in the future, be a solid ground for evaluation of performance against the safety targets.

The national investigation bodies will face new challenges and new common methods and approaches will be developed. Training courses at a European level can help in guiding investigators in looking deeper into the underlying and root causes of accidents, and to analyse the safety management systems when investigating accidents. This will shed new light on the safety performance of the railways in the European Union.

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Table 1 - Fatalities by category of person


| 10 | $\begin{aligned} & \hline \begin{array}{l} \text { Victim types - serious } \\ \text { injuries } \end{array} \end{aligned}$ | Years | ${ }^{\text {AT }}$ | BE | ${ }_{B G}$ | ст | Cz | DE | DK | EE | Et | ES | F1 | FR | HU | \|E | IT | LT | LU | LV | NL | No | PL | PT | R0 | SE | SI | Sk | UK | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| PS00 | Passengets | 2006 | 12 | 63 | 29 |  | 12 | 65 | 4 |  | 14 | 22 | 1 | 17 | 26 | 0 | 39 | 0 |  | 0 | 8 | 1 | 63 | 8 | 28 | 1 | 0 | 6 | 1 | 420 |
|  |  | 2007 | 8 | 41 | 6 | 0 | 18 | 20 | 2 | 0 | 5 | 11 | 0 | 10 | 37 | 0 | 10 | 0 |  | 1 | 2 | 1 | 67 | 5 | 6 | 1 | 1 | 4 | 13 | 269 |
|  |  | 2008 | 6 | 36 | 8 | 1 | 40 | 30 | 3 | 0 | 9 | 3 | 0 | 14 | 28 | 0 | 5 | 0 |  | 2 | 0 | 1 | 44 | 6 | 26 | 3 | 11 | 5 | 1 | 282 |
| 5500 | Employes | 2006 | 19 | 14 | 2 |  | 2 | 18 | 3 |  | 7 | 1 | 3 | 10 | 3 | 1 | 4 | 3 |  | 1 | 1 | 2 | 5 | 2 | 8 | 1 | 9 | 3 | 4 | 126 |
|  |  | 2007 | 9 | 27 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 25 | 1 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 5 | 3 | 0 | 5 | 0 |  | 0 | 1 | 1 | 9 | 2 | 3 | 3 | 5 | 2 | 3 | 110 |
|  |  | 2008 | 12 | 28 | 2 | 0 | 4 | 33 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 3 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 4 | 1 |  | 2 | 1 | 0 | 5 | 2 | 7 | 1 | 10 | 1 | 5 | 131 |
| 1500 | Level crossing users | 2006 | 26 | 14 | 7 |  | 49 | 39 | 3 |  | 20 | 1 | 5 | 13 | 23 | 0 | 16 | 8 |  | 7 | 2 | 1 | 87 | 9 | 0 | 8 | 10 | 12 | 3 | 363 |
|  |  | 2007 | 34 | 25 | 8 | 0 | 41 | 55 | 2 | 13 | 22 | 4 | 2 | 7 | 27 | 0 | 4 | 7 |  | 4 | 7 | 2 | 107 | 8 | 41 | 8 | 15 | 13 | 1 | 457 |
|  |  | 2008 | 23 | 16 | 6 | 0 | 42 | 32 | 2 | 0 | 12 | 2 | 1 | 14 | 16 | 0 | 8 | 4 |  | 7 | 5 | 0 | 113 | 10 | 124 | 1 | 0 | 15 | 5 | 458 |
| U500 | Unauthorised persons | 2006 | 0 | 6 | 23 |  | 25 | 27 | 1 |  | 10 | 11 | 4 | 60 | 22 | 0 | 16 | 14 |  | 25 | 2 | 0 | 75 | 12 | 144 | 4 | 4 | 13 | 14 | 512 |
|  |  | 2007 | 5 | 4 | 17 | 0 | 42 | 34 | 6 | 0 | 7 | 9 | 1 | 12 | 25 | 1 | 21 | 6 |  | 10 | 0 | 1 | 93 | 18 | 41 | 2 | 8 | 17 | 7 | 387 |
|  |  | 2008 | 12 | 2 | 22 | 0 | 52 | 38 | 2 | 5 | 6 | 13 | 2 | 6 | 15 | 0 | 21 | 8 |  | 15 | 0 | 0 | 11 | 20 | 45 | 1 | 20 | 15 | 6 | 437 |
| 0500 | Other persons | 2006 | 19 | 9 | 0 |  | 1 | 0 | 1 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 38 |
|  |  | 2007 | 4 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 23 | 0 | 6 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 12 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |  | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 94 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 7 | 151 |
|  |  | 2008 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 23 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 |  | 5 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 1 | 31 | 0 | 0 | 2 | 4 | 75 |
| TS00 | Total persons | 2006 | 76 | 106 | 61 |  | 89 | 149 | 12 |  | 51 | 35 | 13 | 100 | 75 | 1 | 75 | 25 |  | 33 | 13 | 4 | 230 | 33 | 180 | 16 | 23 | 34 | 25 | 1459 |
|  |  | 2007 | 60 | 98 | 33 | 0 | 101 | 157 | 11 | 19 | 36 | 26 | 3 | 46 | 92 | 2 | 40 | 13 |  | 17 | 10 | 5 | 276 | 34 | 185 | 14 | 29 | 36 | 31 | 1374 |
|  |  | 2008 | 53 | 83 | 38 | 1 | 139 | 156 | 9 | 5 | 29 | 19 | 6 | 76 | 60 | 1 | 38 | 13 |  | 31 | 6 | 1 | 277 | 39 | 233 | 6 | 41 | 38 | 21 | 1419 |
| RO1 | Number of train km | 2006 | 152.19 | 104.937 | 36.09 |  | 158.999 | 1013.5 | 80.541 |  | 19.07 | 210.757 | 50.9 | 508 | 106.787 | 18.242 | 377 | 13.827 |  | 17.122 | 133 | 47.392 | 221.737 | 39.264 | 94.9 | 132.295 | 18.98 | 50.978 | 535.757 | 4142.266 |
|  | (milion) | 2007 | 155 | 103.587 | 36.03 | 6.533 | 152.89 | 10487 | 78.7 | 12.056 | 19.905 | 216.873 | 52.577 | 529.54 | 114 | 16.832 | 370 | 14.992 |  | 18.578 | 140 | 47.392 | 223.031 | 40.98 | 96.262 | 134.345 | 19.16 | 51.003 | 538.104 | 4237.070 |
|  |  | 2008 | 158.4 | 92.9 | 35.075 | 5.54 | 174.961 | 1043.5 | 82 | 7.234 | 21.164 | 214.349 | 53.259 | 541 | 109 | 16.494 | 366.863 | 15.817 |  | 19.525 | 139 | 46.841 | 224.359 | 41.76 | 96.145 | 138.194 | 20.098 | 49.332 | 548 | 4260.809 |
| R02 | Number of passenger | 2006 | 8830 | 9607 | 2420 |  | 6908.99 | 77803 | 6274 |  | 1811 | 2047.531 | 3540 | 76470 | 9586 | 1872.067 | 58679 | 430 |  | 992 | 15600 | 2859.751 | 18173 | 3876 |  | 9716 | 11370 | 2194 | 49750 | 399239.339 |
|  | km (million) | 2007 | 9149 | 9932 | 2423 | 1.214 | 6906.6 | 79100 | 6353 | 3.146 | 1930 | 20584 | 3778 | 78740 | 10080 | 2007.065 | 49090 | 409 |  | 983.026 | 16400 | 2859.751 | 19374 | 3990 | 6724.1 | 10295.949 | 812 | 214.956 | 4791 | 391863.807 |
|  |  | 2008 | 10600 | 10403 | 2334 |  | 6659 | 82500 | 6474 | 8573 | 1657 | 22077542 | 4052 | 87000 | 8288 | 1975.786 | 49407.951 | 397 |  | 951 | 16500 | 2859.751 | 2014 | 4154 | 6955.73 | 10838 | 0.834 | 2278.8 | 50405 | 417481.401 |

Table 3A - 2006 - Fatalities by type of accident and person category

| 10 | Accidentrypes | Vctim types - fatalities | at | BE | BG | ст | T Cz | Cz DE | E DK | EE | E El | EL Es | S F | FR | Hu | IE | $1{ }^{1}$ | LT | Lu | LV | NL | No | PL | PT | Ro | SE | 51 | S Sk | k uk | K Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| TK01 | Collisions oftrains | Total | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 00 | 00 |  | 4 | 40 | 0 | 9 | 9 | 0 | 3 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - 1 | 10 | 01 | $1{ }^{19}$ |
| PK01 |  | Passengers | 0 | 0 | - |  |  | 00 | 00 |  | 1 | 10 | 0 | 4 | 4 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | - | - - | - - | 0 | 0 5 |
| SK01 |  | Emploves | 0 | 0 | - |  |  | 00 | 00 |  | 1 | 10 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | - 3 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | - | 0 | - | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 8 |
| LK01 |  | Level crosing users | 0 | 0 | - |  |  | 00 | 00 |  | - | - 0 | 0 | - | - - | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | - | - - | - | 0 | 0 |
| UK01 |  | Unauthorised persons | - | 0 | - |  | 0 | 00 | 00 |  | 2 | 20 | 00 | 3 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | $0{ }^{5}$ |
| OK01 |  | Other persons | 0 | 0 | - |  | 0 | 00 | 00 |  | 0 | 00 | 00 | - | - - | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | - | - | - | 1 | $1 \quad 1$ |
| TK02 | Deraiments oftrains | Total | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 00 | 00 |  | 0 | 07 | 70 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 00 | 0 | $0 \quad 7$ |
| PK02 |  | Passengers | 0 | 0 | - |  | 0 | 00 | 00 |  | 0 | 07 | 70 | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | 07 |
| SK02 |  | Emploves | 0 | 0 | - |  | 0 | 00 | 00 |  | 0 | 00 | 0 | - | - - | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 |
| LK02 |  | Level crosing users | 0 | 0 | - |  | 0 | 00 | 00 |  |  | 0 | 00 | - | - - | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 |
| UK02 |  | Unauthorised persons | - | 0 | - |  |  | 00 | 00 |  | 0 | 00 | 00 | - | - - | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 |
| OK02 |  | Other persons | 0 | 0 | $\cdot$ |  |  | 00 | 00 |  | 0 | 00 | 0 | - | - - | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 |
| TK03 | Level crossing accidents | Total | 22 | 10 | 4 |  | 31 | 3150 | 50 |  | 14 | 4.14 | 4.5 | 40 | - 22 | 0 | - 19 | 8 |  | 4 | 12 | 0 | 35 | 18 | 22 | 9 | 0 | $0 \quad 17$ | $7{ }^{7}$ | $5 \quad 367$ |
| PK03 |  | Passengers | 0 | 1 | - |  |  | 00 | 00 |  | 2 | 20 | 0 | - | - - | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | - | 0 | - | - - | - 1 | 10 | 0 5 |
| SK03 |  | Emploves | 0 | 0 | - |  |  | 00 | 00 |  | 0 | 00 | 0 | 2 | 2 - | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2 | - | 0 | - | - | - - | 0 | 04 |
| LKO3 |  | Level crosing users | 22 | 9 | 4 |  | 31 | 3150 | 5 |  | 12 | 12.14 | $4{ }^{4}$ | 38 | - 22 | 0 | - 19 | 8 |  | 4 | 12 | 0 | 32 | 18 | 22 | 9 | 9 | 16 | 65 | $5 \quad 357$ |
| UK03 |  | Unauthorised persons | - | 0 | - |  |  | 00 | 00 |  |  | 0 | 00 | - | - - | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | - | - | - - | 0 | 0 |
| OK03 |  | Other persons | 0 | 0 | - |  |  | 00 | $0 \quad 1$ |  | 0 | 00 | 0 | $\cdot$ | - - | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | - | - | - - | 0 | 01 |
| TK04 | Accidents to persons caused by rolling stock in motion | Total | 22 | 10 | 32 |  | 21 | 21.142 | 12.12 |  | 20 | 233 | 318 | 37 | 41 | 0 | - 55 | 26 |  | 26 | 4 | 0 | 257 | 35 | 108 | 10 | - 21 | 21.35 | $5 \quad 27$ | 992 |
| PK04 |  | Passengers | 0 | 3 | 1 |  |  | $4{ }^{18}$ | 80 |  | 0 | 02 | 21 | 8 | 4 | 0 | ) 5 | 0 |  | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | - | 8 | - | - | 3 | 30 | - 58 |
| SK04 |  | Emploves | 0 | 0 | - |  | 1 | 16 | 61 |  | 0 | 01 | 10 | - | - - | 0 | - 8 | 3 |  | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | - | - | - - | 0 | 022 |
| LKO4 |  | Level crosing users | 0 | 0 | - |  |  | 00 | 00 |  |  | 0 | 00 | - | - - | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | - | 9 | 9 | 0 | $0 \quad 9$ |
| UK04 |  | Unauthorised persons | - | 7 | 31 |  | 16 | 168 | 81 |  | 20 | 2030 | 30.17 | 29 | 37 | 0 | - 42 | 23 |  | 26 | 2 | 0 | 253 | 34 | 100 | 10 | - 12 | 1232 | 224 | 4 864 |
| OK04 |  | Other persons | 22 | 0 | - |  |  | 00 | $0 \quad 10$ |  | 0 | 00 | 00 | - | - - | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 0 | 0 | - | - | - - | 3 | $3 \quad 39$ |
| TK05 | Fires in rolling stock | Total | 0 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 00 | 00 |  | 0 | 00 | 00 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 00 | 00 | 0 |
| PK05 |  | Passengers | 0 | 0 | - |  |  | 00 | 00 |  | 0 | 00 | 00 | - | - | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | - | - | - - | 0 | 0 |
| SK05 |  | Emploves | 0 | 0 | - |  |  | 00 | 00 |  | 0 | 00 | 00 | - | - - | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | - | - | - - | 0 | 0 |
| LK05 |  | Level crosing users | 0 | 0 | - |  |  | 00 | 00 |  | - | 0 | 00 | - | - - | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | - | - | - - | 0 | 0 |
| UK05 |  | Unauthorised persons | - | 0 | - |  |  | 00 | 00 |  | 0 | 00 | 00 | - | - - | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | - | - | - - | 0 | 0 |
| OK05 |  | Other persons | 0 | 0 |  |  |  | 00 | 00 |  | 0 | 00 | 00 | - | - - | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 |
| TK06 | Other accidents | Total | 2 | 0 | 0 |  |  | 00 | 00 |  | 0 | 02 | 20 | 12 | 0 | 0 | - 2 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 1 | 18 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | $0 \quad 49$ | 0 | 086 |
| PK06 |  | Passengers | 0 | 0 | - |  |  | 00 | 00 |  | 0 | 00 | 00 | - | - - | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 1 | 8 | - | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | $0{ }^{\circ}$ |
| SK06 |  | Emploves | 0 | 0 | - |  |  | 00 | 00 |  | 0 | 02 | 20 | - | - - | 0 | - 2 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | 04 |
| LKO6 |  | Level crosing users | 0 | 0 | - |  |  | 00 | 00 |  |  | 0 | 00 | - | - - | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | - | - | - - | 0 | 00 |
| UK06 |  | Unauthorised persons | - | 0 | - |  |  | 00 | 00 |  | 0 | 00 | 0 | 12 | 12 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 10 | - | 0 | - | - | 49 | 0 | 071 |
| OK06 |  | Other persons | 2 | 0 | - |  |  | 00 | 00 |  |  | 00 | 0 | - | - - | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | - | 0 | - | - | - | 0 | 0 |

Table 3B - 2007 - Fatalities by type of accident and person category


Table 4A - 2006 - Serious injuries by type of accident and person category

Table 4B - 2007 - Serious injuries by type of accident and person category

Table 4C - 2008 - Serious injuries by type of accident and person category

Table 5 - Total and relative number of suicides

Table 6 - Number of accidents by type of accidents

Table 7 - Number of precursors to accidents

| [ | Preursos toaccients |  | ${ }_{\text {at }}$ | BE | ${ }^{86}$ | ct | cz | DE | DK | Ex | El | Es | Fil | ${ }^{\text {FR }}$ | HU | \|E | IT | ¢ | U | Lv | NL | No | ${ }^{\text {PL }}$ | ${ }^{\text {PT}}$ | Rо | SE | s\| | sk | uk | Tota |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 101 | Boterails | 2006 | 171 | 115 | 7 |  | 0 | 124 | 0 |  |  | 74 | ${ }_{6}$ | 11 | 768 | 8 | 361 | 1 |  | 1 | 34 | 51 | 3054 | 45 | 349 | 256 | 76 | 1 | 232 | 5884 |
|  |  | 207 | . | 98 | 92 | 13 | 21 | 407 | 32 | 7 | 269 | 54 | 21 | 323 | 654 | 1 | 430 | 62 |  | 5 | 3 | 10 | 2484 | 39 | 319 | 187 | 57 | 5 | 192 | 5813 |
|  |  | 2008 |  | 281 | 67 | 8 | 4 | ${ }_{536}$ | 14 | 7 | 223 | 70 | 19 | 39 | 76 | 3 | ${ }^{84}$ | 1 |  | 4 | 31 | 36 | 2396 | 33 | 380 | 218 | 79 | 10 | 170 | 5699 |
| 102 | Track buckes | 2006 |  | 1 |  |  | 1 | 72 | 1 |  |  | 186 | 10 | 171 | 3 | 5 | 6743 | 2 |  | 1 | 143 | 96 | 80 | 95 | 0 | 80 | 26 | 1 | ${ }_{8}$ | 7803 |
|  |  | 2007 |  | 0 | 25 | 0 | 0 | 68 | 6 | 0 |  | 171 | 7 | 17 | 4 | 1 | 3113 | 40 |  | 1 | 13 | 14 | 17 | 40 | 3 | 102 | 11 | 2 | 5 | 3820 |
|  |  | 2008 |  | 0 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 40 | 8 | 0 | 110 | 218 | 3 | 194 | 8 | 0 | 41 | 0 |  | 3 | 8 | 17 | 19 | 37 | 0 | 87 | 16 | 0 | 16 | 835 |
| ${ }^{103}$ | Wrong-side signalling failures | 2006 |  | 1 | - |  | 0 | 0 | 544 |  | 0 | 6 |  | 220 | - | 4 | 4 | 4 |  | 3 | . | 0 |  |  | 2335 | 8 | . | 4 | 617 | 3820 |
|  |  | 2007 | 7 | 1 | 10 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 193 | 0 | 0 | 5 |  | 27 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 245 |  | 0 | . | 0 | 0 | 0 | 2456 | 6 | 0 | 6 | 550 | 3757 |
|  |  | 2008 | 3 | 1 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 119 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 2 | 27 | 8 | 2 | 2 | 39 |  | 0 | 18 | 1 | 52 | 0 | 2557 | 12 | 163 | 2 | 901 | 4178 |
| 104 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Signals passed at } \\ & \text { danger } \end{aligned}$ | 2006 | 15 | 55 | 5 |  | 60 | . | 756 |  | 1 | 93 | 18 | 35 | 8 | 35 | 24 | 124 |  | 4 | 292 | 78 |  | 24 | 425 | 194 | 147 | 78 | 352 | 2823 |
|  |  | 2007 | 12 | 81 | 15 | 5 | 26 | 727 | 568 | 2 | 1 | ${ }_{93}$ | 22 | 112 | 12 | 31 | 15 | 60 |  | 2 | 275 | 73 | 4013 | 20 | 425 | 217 | 154 | 79 | 324 | 7364 |
|  |  | 2008 | 16 | 97 | 12 | 3 | 26 | 760 | 510 | 2 | 1 | 11 | 30 | 124 | 8 | 22 | 20 | 3 |  | 5 | 240 | 70 | 2653 | 24 | 396 | 275 | 5 | 75 | 316 | 5804 |
| 105 | Borten wrees | 2006 | . | 0 |  |  | 0 | 2 | 19 |  | . | 1 | 14 | - | 1 | 0 | 1 | 0 |  | 5 | 0 | 52 | 137 | 1 | 1 | 8 | . |  | 0 | 242 |
|  |  | 2007 | 2 | 1 | 17 | 0 | 0 | 6 | 22 | 0 | 1 | 0 | . | 2 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 9 | 0 | 39 | 66 | 0 | 2 | 2 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 170 |
|  |  | 2008 | 0 | 1 | 13 | 0 | 0 | 1 | , | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 |  | 2 | 0 | 6 | 57 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 90 |
| 106 | Broven axes | 2006 | . | 0 |  |  | 0 | 9 | 23 |  | . | 0 | 0 | . | 3 | 0 | 0 | 22 |  | 2 | 0 | 0 | 3 | 3 | 2 | 10 | 1 |  | 0 | 78 |
|  |  | 2007 | 3 | 0 | 29 | 0 | 0 | 4 | 8 | 0 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 28 |  | 1 | 0 | 0 | 22 | 1 | 2 | 3 | 0 | 0 | 0 | ${ }^{103}$ |
|  |  | 2008 | 3 | 0 | 7 | 0 | 0 | 9 | 9 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 |  | 0 | 1 | 2 | 67 | 0 | 2 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 104 |
| 801 | Numberof fan km | 2006 | 15219 | 109493 | 3609 |  | 158.999 | 1013.5 | 80.41 |  | 1907 | 210.57 | 50.9 | 588 | 106.787 | 18.24 | 37 | 13827 |  | 17.122 | 133 | 47.32 | 227.737 | 39264 | 949 | 132295 | 1898 | 50978 | 535,757 | 4142266 |
|  |  | 2007 | 155 | 100.58 | 3603 | 6.533 | 15289 | 1048.7 | ${ }^{78.7}$ | 12056 | 19.905 | 216873 | 5257 | 52.54 | 114 | 16.832 | 370 | 14.92 |  | 18.578 | 140 | 47.32 | 223.331 | 40.98 | 96222 | 134.435 | 19.16 | 51.03 | 538.104 | 4237.00 |
|  |  | 2008 | 158.4 | 92.9 | 35075 | 5.54 | 174961 | 1043.5 | 82 | 7.234 | 21.164 | 214349 | 53.25 | 541 | 109 | 16.94 | 366883 | 15.817 |  | 19.525 | 139 | 48881 | 224359 | 41.76 | 96.45 | 138.194 | 20.098 | 49332 | 548 | 4208800 |


| 10 | Cateory | Years | ${ }_{\text {at }}$ | ${ }^{\text {BE }}$ | ${ }^{86}$ | с | cz | DE | ok | ${ }^{\text {EF }}$ | El | Es | F | ${ }^{\text {R }}$ | HU | $1 E$ | I | [ | w | uv | NL | No | PL | PT | R0 | SE | si | Sk | UK | Tota |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| coo | Costs ofall cricients | 2006 | 0 | 0 | 109619 |  | 301547788 | 0 | 0 |  | 0 |  | 45366103 | 0 | 187308 | 750000 | 0 | 1242 |  | 4324 |  | 34625211041 | 4485573.48 | 521139233 | 638670 | 67145298288 | 194225 | 1160000 | ${ }^{12026873}$ | 33452985879 |
|  |  | 2007 | 0 | 0 | ${ }^{67463}$ | 0 | 384492 |  | 1378072 | 0 | 219403 |  | 35316435 | 0 | 16.688 | 110000 | 0 | 6000.68 |  | 3393087 | 0 | 6375000 | 537003.01 | 6025000 | 580503966 | 7950122366 |  | 199000 | 189881101 | 399981992084 |
|  |  | 2008 | 0 | 0 | 68837 | 1800000 | 10079369 |  | 280182 | 17974735 | 2193186 |  | 42242859 | 0 |  | 80000 | 0 | ${ }^{1181319}$ |  | 3565680.46 | 9900 | 697500 | 28551623 | 4769000 | 155419079 | 5505795050 | 301987 | 280635 | 1292563 | 40668030.90 |
| 001 | Costs of deaths | 2006 |  |  |  |  | 945110.87 |  |  |  |  |  | ${ }^{42270504}$ |  | 33654 |  |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 4724000 | 112 | 35775161220 |  | 75000 | 8064360 | 27658142160 |
|  |  | 2007 |  |  | 0 | 0 | 12623 |  | 12017700 | 0 |  |  | 3459918 |  | . |  |  | 0 |  | 1329 |  | 0 | 156295,74 | 54980000 | 2125 | 43306744,194 | 0 | 0 | 12925500 | 274952624894 |
|  |  | 2008 |  |  | 16352.65 | 0 | 52225 |  | 2818474 | 0 |  |  | 4073889 |  |  |  |  | 0 |  | 11186 | 4020 | 0 | 14957.65 | 4054000 | 1081 | 31201397849 |  |  | 11448875 | 299345943629 |
| 02 | Costs finguies | 2006 |  | . |  |  | 47437295 |  |  |  | . |  | 309599 |  | 559 |  |  | 0 |  | 951 |  | 31657 |  | 3934062 |  | 8720886.02 |  | 387000 | 5600250 | 22248537.23 |
|  |  | 2007 |  | . | 2523 | 0 | 6208 |  | 172252 | 0 |  |  | 74657 |  | . |  |  | 0 |  | 0 |  | 275000 | 2469324 | 431000 |  | 7412473.118 | 0 | 0 | 694310 | 2144622358 |
|  |  | 2008 |  |  | 0 | 0 | 9929 |  | 178748 | 0 | . |  | 150996 |  | - |  |  | 0 |  | 740 | 3100 | 275000 | 6319306 | 503000 |  | 2675483.87 |  |  | 4073604 | 15515779.821 |
| c03 | Costs of replacement or repair of damaged RS and railway instalations | 2006 |  |  | 109619 |  | 159600356 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 1838231 | 750000 |  | 12442 |  | 40037 |  | 16339474941 | 448573.48 |  | 62958 | 2107872.56 | 194425 | 20000 | 1607488 | 65945657.551 |
|  |  | 2007 |  |  | 572084 | 0 | 372491 |  |  | 0 | 193325 |  |  | . | 16.688 | 110000 |  | ${ }^{60001.68}$ |  | 335235.13 |  | 300000 | 509591.57 |  | 317177.2 | 2475882796 |  | 189000 | 4406218 | 86220493.064 |
|  |  | 2008 |  |  | 63436886 | 6000000 | 9410339 |  |  | - 14610195 | 618441 |  |  |  |  | 800000 |  | ${ }_{181819.9}$ |  | 33688884 | 24300 | 360000 | 267815 | 75000 | 149018198 | 197507462 | 301987 | 269224 | 6228951 | 11249974 |
| 004 | Costs of deay etc. | 2006 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 864 |  |  | 0 |  | 2436 |  | 1820480 |  | ${ }^{939861.37}$ | 870 | 1567322366 |  | 300 | 17951385 | 38677648836 |
|  |  | 2007 |  |  | 100016 | 0 | 10170 |  |  | 0 | 186188 |  |  | . |  |  |  | 0 |  | 2745 |  | 310000 | ${ }^{9322646}$ | 980000 | 26124.14 | 4035032258 | 0 | 100000 | 8804773 | 17364251.788 |
|  |  | 2008 |  |  | 3665.49 | 200000 | 47529 |  |  | -3364, 5 | 157474 |  |  |  | . |  |  | 0 |  | 19289525 | 24300 | 310000 | 10520.52 | 1376000 | 50664.98 | 2108888710 |  | 16751 | 4505253 | 83316800450 |
| R01 | Numbere ftran km | 2006 | 15219 | 109.937 | 3669 |  | 155.99 | 1013.5 | 80541 |  | 1907 | 210.57 | 509 | 508 | 106.787 | 18.24 | 37 | 13827 |  | 17 | 133 | 47.392 | 221.73 | 39264 | 949 | 132.295 | 1898 | 50.98 | 535757 | 4142266 |
|  |  | 2007 | 155 | 109.58 | 3663 | 6.533 | 15289 | 10487 | 78.1 | 12.56 | 19.905 | 216873 | 52571 | 529.54 | 114 | 16832 | 370 | 14992 |  | 19 | 140 | 47.392 | 223.031 | 40.98 | 96262 | 133.35 | 19.16 | 51.003 | 538.104 | 4237.00 |
|  |  | 2008 | 15.4 | 929 | 35075 | 5.54 | 174961 | 10485 | 82 | 7.23 | 21.164 | 214339 | 53.29 | 541 | 109 | 16.494 | 366883 | 15.87 |  | 20 | 139 | 46841 | 224.35 | 41.76 | 96.145 | 138.194 | 20.98 | 49332 | 548 | 4268809 |

Table 9 - Hours lost due to accidents

| 10 | Cateoor | Yeas | ${ }_{\text {at }}$ | BE | ${ }^{86}$ | ct | cz | DE | DK | EE | El | Es | F1 | Rr | HU | IE | IT | ¢ | u | uv | NL | N0 | Pl | pr | R0 | SE | s\| | sk | uk | Total |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| wo | $\begin{aligned} & \text { Total number of } \\ & \text { hours lost } \end{aligned}$ | 2006 |  |  |  |  |  | . |  |  | 95312 | . |  | . |  |  | 9039 | 441.2 |  | 0 |  | 464.5 | 3962 |  | 233 | 2299 | . |  | 3340 | 1994037.7 |
|  |  | 207 |  | . |  | 0 | 1189 |  |  | 0 | 5840 |  |  | . |  |  | 121646 | 8149.75 |  | 0 |  | 9283 | 2563572 |  | 1185 | 7124 | 0 | 0 | 21349 | 91920.07 |
|  |  | 2008 |  |  |  | 0 | 4500 |  |  | 200 | 95104 |  |  |  |  |  | 2522016 | 160.03 |  | 240 |  | 148 | 1625 |  | 723 | 1794 |  | 0 | 38115 | 168341.046 |
| w10 | Number of hours lostreative to total number of working hours | 2006 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  | 0.006 |  |  |  |  |  | , | 0.000 |  | 0 |  | 0.000 |  |  |  | 0 |  |  | 0 | 0.006 |
|  |  | 2007 |  | . |  | 0 | 0.000 |  |  |  | 0.000 |  |  |  |  |  | , | 0.000 |  | 0 |  | 0.001 | 0000 |  | 0.000 | 0 | 0 |  | 0000 | 0.002 |
|  |  | 2008 |  |  |  | 0 | 0.000 |  |  |  | 0.007 |  |  |  |  |  | 0 | 0.000 |  | 0.000 |  | 0.000 | 0.000 |  | 0.000 | 0.000 |  |  | 0.000 | 0.00 |
| R04 | Total number of working hours | 2006 |  |  |  |  | 102000 |  |  |  | 16027 |  |  |  | 837 |  | 14570322 | 18699348 |  | 24181 |  | 119890 |  | 16239 |  | 15163144 | 1685 |  | 18412740 | 344595586348 |
|  |  | 2007 |  |  |  | 340235 | 8782.437 |  |  | 0 | 15134 |  |  |  |  |  | 13110054 | 18448 |  | 22010 |  | 12597,95 | 877513 | 15812 | 117588368 | 27488739 | 1668 | 0 | 188624 | 159983138935 |
|  |  | 2008 |  | . |  | 351481 | 91000 | . |  | 0 | 14608 |  |  |  | 36656 |  | ${ }^{1288887327}$ | 18828 |  | 20947 |  | 13215047 | 94664212 | 16006 | 17589889 | 3600744 | 16788 | 0 | 235796 | 165697138.168 |

Table 10 - Technical safety of infrastructure and its implementation

Table 11 - Management of safety - number of audits planned and conducted

| 10 | Categor | Years | ${ }^{\text {at }}$ | BE | ${ }^{86}$ | cT | cz | DE | ok | Et | E | Es | F | ${ }^{\text {FR}}$ | HU | IE | IT | [ | ${ }^{10}$ | iv | NL | No | pl | pr | R0 | SE | s | sk | uk | Tota |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| A01 | Total number of accomplished audits | 2006 | . | 0 | 279 |  | 159 | . | ${ }_{3}$ |  | . | 731 | 44 | 1 | . | 21 | 1278 | 21 |  | 131 | . | 55 | 0 | 2 |  | 319 | . | 6 | 720 | 6240 |
|  |  | 2007 | . | 0 | 3215 | 25 | 290 | . | 36 | 249 | . | 755 | 43 | 44 | 21 | 13 | 2157 | 27 |  | 1853 | 20 | 66 | 0 | 6 |  | 188 | - | 0 | 189 | 919 |
|  |  | 2008 | 109 | 0 | 3196 | 24 | 263 | . | 32 | 83 | 0 | 77 | ${ }_{3}$ | 50 | . | 21 | 2158 | 29 |  | 265 | 20 | 72 | 0 | 1 |  | 156 | 4 | 1 | 47 | 7341 |
| A02 |  | 2006 | . | 0 | - |  | 1 | - | 1.38 |  | - | 1.005 | 0.91 | 1 | - | 1.05 | 0.983 | 0.81 |  | 1.19 | . | 0.7 | 1 | 1 |  | 0.982 | - | - | 0.932 | 13.92 |
|  |  | 2007 | . | - |  | 0.85 | 1.1 | - | 1.57 | 1 |  | 1.015 | 0.67 | 1 | 0.77 | 1 | 0.563 | 1 |  | 0.975 | 1 | 0.74 | 0 | , |  | 0.969 |  | 0 | 0.976 | 16.198 |
|  |  | 2008 | 0.96 | 0 |  | 0.59 | 1 | . | 1.33 | 0.94 | 0 | 1.20 | 097 | 1 | . | 1.05 | 0.835 | 1 |  | 1.15 | 1 | 0.95 | 0 | 1 |  | 0.881 | 1 | 1 | 1.02 | 18.89 |

## Comments on CSI data tables

ERA has reviewed the reported CSI data and all large fluctuations has been checked by the reporting NSA. In the table below are given comments for the data where for example fluctuations are due to changes in reporting procedures or where the national definition applied gives a value that deviates from European average

| Table | Country | Year | Variable | Comment |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Table 3C | CZ | 2008 | PK01 | The high number of passengers seriously injured and killed in 2008 is due to one serious accident, a bridge collapse and subsequent high speed train collision (8 August 2008). |
| Table 4A | EL | 2006 | PS03 | One significant level crossing accident in 2006 explaining the large number of passengers seriously injured. |
| Table 4B | BE | 2007 | PS03 | The figure includes suicides. It has not been possible to correct the figure. |
|  | BE | 2007 | SS06 | The figure includes work accidents. |
| Table 4C | DE | 2008 | PS01 | The large number of passenger seriously injured is mainly due to one big accident. |
|  | CZ | 2008 | PS01 | The high number of passengers seriously injured and killed in 2008 is due to one serious accident, a bridge collapse and subsequent high speed train collision (8 August 2008). |
| Table 6 | BG | 2006 | N01-N06 | The variable includes non-significant accidents. |
|  | DE | 2006 | N01-N06 | Data include non-significant accidents. |
|  | Fl | 2006 | N04-N05 | Data include non-significant accidents. |
|  | FR | 2006 | N01-N02 | Does not include collisions/derailments on sidings. |
|  | HU | 2006-2008 | N01-N06 | The fluctuation in number of occurrences between 2006 and 2008 is due to a combination of change in reporting procedures and true change in number of events. |
|  | RO | 2006 | N01 | The variable does not include collisions with objects. |
|  | RO | 2006 | N05 | Does not include fires intentionally caused to sabotage. |
|  | RO | 2006-07 | N02 | The variable only considers derailments of trains, as trains with planned movements. Derailments with isolated locomotives are excluded. |
| Table 7 | BG | 2006 | 101 | Only includes broken rails that gave more than 30 min delay of traffic. |
|  | DE | 2006 | 101 | Only includes broken rails with a subsequent dangerous situation. |
|  | DE | 2008 | 101 | The large nr of broken rails was due to a severe winter. |
|  | DK | 2006 | 103 | National definition: All events when the signal changes unexpectantly, also to a more restrictive is registered. |


| Table | Country | Year | Variable | Comment |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Table 7 | DK | 2006 | 104 | National definition: All events when a restrictive signal is passed is registered, also when there is no real danger and in many cases just by a few meters. |
|  | FR | 2006 | 101 | There was a change in reporting procedures between 2006 and 2007. Using 2007 reporting procedures, the figure would have been 346. |
|  | FR | 2006 | 104 | There was a change in reporting procedures between 2006 and 2007. Using 2007 reporting procedures, the figure would have been 110. |
|  | IT | 2008 | 101 | There has been a change in reporting procedures between 2007 and 2008. |
|  | IT | 2006-2008 | 102 | There has been a change in reporting procedures between 2006 and 2008. |
|  | LT | 2006-07 | 101-104 | Fluctuation in reported nr of occurrences is the effect of a change in definition. |
|  | NL | 2006 | 101 | The large reported number of track buckles is confirmed. 2006 was a hot summer causing a lot of track buckles. |
|  | NO | 2006-07 | 101-102 | Varying weather conditions caused large fluctuations in this variable between 2006 and 2007. |
|  | NO | 2008 | 101, 105 | The change in reported nr of events is due to an improved implementation of existing reporting procedures. |
|  | PL | 2006 | 103, 104 | The infrastructure manager did not collect information on incidents and near misses before 2007. The information is therefore incomplete. SPADs were not collected. |
|  | PL | 2006-2008 | 103-106 | There has been a change in reporting procedures explaning the fluctuation in reported nr of events. |
|  | RO | 2006-2008 | 103 | The variable includes all signalling failures. |
| Table 8 | LV | 2008 | C01-C04 | The large numbers are explained by a small number of serious accidents and improved reporting and data collection procedures. |
| Table 9 | RO | 2008 | R04 | The change in reported nr of working hours is due to a change in definitions and reporting procedures. |
|  | UK | 2007 | R04 | The change in reported nr of working hours is due to a change in reporting procedures. |
| Table 10 | BE | 2006-07 | R03 | The figure is taken from Eurostat 2005 data. |
|  | DE | 2006 | R03 | The figure given is per 31 December 2007. |
|  | IT | 2008 | R03 | The increase in network length is due to a change in reporting from line km to track km . |
|  | PL | 2006-07 | R03 | The figure is excluding crossovers on main lines and is taken from Eurostat 2005 data. |
| Table 11 | LV | 2006 | A01 | The figure only includes audits conducted by State Railway Technical Inspectorate. |
|  | LV | 2007 | A01 | The figure includes audits conducted by IM, RU and State Railway Technical Inspectorate. |
|  | UK | 2008 | A01 | The change in reported nr of audits is due to a change in interpretation of the definition. |

Annex 2 - Serious accidents with five or more fatalities since 1990

| Date | Country | Place | Type | Fatalities | Injuries |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1990-02-02 | DE | Rüsselsheim station | Train collision | 17 | 37 |
| 1990-03-22 | DE | Gröbers, Halle | Train collision | 5 | 0 |
| 1990-04-16 | NO | Between Skoeyen and Lysaker | Train collision | 5 | 0 |
| 1990-06-23 | PL | Suburb of Wroclaw | Level crossing accident | 7 | 0 |
| 1990-07-03 | ES | Unknown | Train collision | 6 | 2 |
| 1990-08-21 | PL | Wlochy | Train collision | 16 | 42 |
| 1990-08-25 | CZ | Spálov, Between Železný Brod and Tanvald stations | Train collision | 10 | 16 |
| 1991-01-27 | CZ | Chlumchany | Accident to person caused by RS in motion | 5 | 1 |
| 1991-03-31 | SK | Jesenske-Rimavska Sobota | Level crossing accident | 6 | 0 |
| 1991-06-29 | EL | Corinth | Level crossing accident | 8 | 0 |
| 1991-07-28 | PT | Linha da Beira Alta - Monte Lobos/ Carregal do Sal | Level crossing accident | 5 | 0 |
| 1991-10-12 | DE | Cologne | Accident to person caused by RS in motion | 6 | 1 |
| 1991-10-17 | FR | Melun Station, near Paris | Train collision | 16 | 50 |
| 1992-01-07 | HU | Between Vámosgyörk and Hort | Level crossing accident | 5 | 8 |
| 1992-01-27 | IT | Ciampino, Near Rome | Train collision | 6 | 0 |
| 1992-06-10 | IT | Caluso, Near Turin | Train collision | 6 | 33 |
| 1992-08-03 | SK | Budkovce - Drahnov | Train collision | 6 | 0 |
| 1992-08-17 | BG | Kazichene station | Train collision | 8 | 57 |
| 1992-08-19 | AT | Puchberg | Train collision | 5 | 30 |
| 1992-09-26 | HU | Agárd, Gárdony | Level crossing accident | 16 | 0 |
| 1992-10-01 | BG | Harmanli | Train collision | 5 | 1 |
| 1992-10-18 | PL | Chelmce | Level crossing accident | 6 | 0 |
| 1992-11-15 | DE | Northeim | Train derailment | 11 | 0 |
| 1992-11-30 | NL | Hoofddorp | Train derailment | 5 | 6 |
| 1992-12-10 | DE | Bad Oldesloe station | Accident to person caused by RS in motion | 7 | 1 |


| Date | Country | Place | Type | Fatalities | Injuries |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1993-02-12 | HU | Between Bátaszék-Pörböly stations | Level crossing accident | 10 | 12 |
| 1993-08-01 | RO | Urleasca | Level crossing accident | 12 | 0 |
| 1993-08-03 | ES | Vega de Anzo, near Oviedo | Train collision | 12 | 5 |
| 1993-08-14 | HU | Between Makó and Makó-Újváros station | Level crossing accident | 6 | 0 |
| 1993-10-03 | NO | Nordstrand, near Oslo | Train collision | 6 | 6 |
| 1994-02-17 | PT | Linha do Sul - Level crossing at pk 274.94 (São Marcos da Serra) | Level crossing accident | 6 | 2 |
| 1994-03-21 | CH | Between Daeniken and Schoenenwerd | Train collision with an obstacle | 9 | 14 |
| 1994-04-30 | PT | Linha do Oeste - Level crossing at pk 101.71 | Level crossing accident | 5 | 1 |
| 1994-05-29 | PT | Linha da Póvoa - Level crossing at pk 39.91 | Level crossing accident | 5 | 8 |
| 1994-09-11 | EL | Tithoréa | Train derailment | 5 | 0 |
| 1994-09-29 | DE | Bad Bramstedt | Train collision | 7 | 15 |
| 1994-10-15 | UK | Cowden, Kent | Train collision | 5 | 0 |
| 1994-11-17 | ES | Santa Fe/Gador | Level crossing accident | 7 | 0 |
| 1994-12-02 | HU | Szajol station | Train derailment | 31 | 54 |
| 1995-02-27 | ES | San Sebastian | Train derailment | 5 | 33 |
| 1995-06-24 | CZ | Krouna, Between Policka and Chrudim | Train collision | 19 | 4 |
| 1995-06-27 | HU | Between Györszabadhegy and Nyúl stations | Level crossing accident | 6 | 7 |
| 1995-09-11 | HU | Sorkifalud | Level crossing accident | 5 | 2 |
| 1995-09-22 | FR | Agde | Level crossing accident | 5 | 0 |
| 1996-01-26 | RO | Nr Tirgusor | Level crossing accident | 12 | 0 |
| 1996-02-26 | HU | Kutas | Level crossing accident | 13 | 10 |
| 1996-03-03 | RO | Gavojdia | Level crossing accident | 6 | 9 |
| 1996-10-07 | BE | Berlaar | Level crossing accident | 5 | 0 |
| 1997-01-12 | IT | Piacenza | Train derailment | 8 | 30 |
| 1997-03-31 | ES | Uharte Arakil station, Pamplona, Navarra | Train derailment | 18 | 40 |
| 1997-05-05 | PL | Reptowo, Szczecin | Train derailment | 12 | 40 |
| 1997-07-05 | DE | Between Neustadt, Marburg and Stadtallendorf | Train collision with an obstacle | 6 | 2 |


| Date | Country | Place | Type | Fatalities | Injuries |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 1997-09-08 | FR | Saint-Antoine-de-Breuilh, Port-Sainte-Foy | Level crossing accident | 13 | 18 |
| 1997-09-19 | UK | Southall, London | Train collision | 7 | 30 |
| 1998-03-06 | FI | Jyväskylä | Train derailment | 10 | 8 |
| 1998-05-27 | HU | Between Létavértes and Monostorpályi stations | Level crossing accident | 5 | 0 |
| 1998-06-03 | DE | Eschede | Train derailment | 101 | 87 |
| 1998-09-19 | NO | Gol station | Level crossing accident | 5 | 0 |
| 1999-01-28 | SK | Bratislava | Accident to person caused by RS in motion | 6 | 0 |
| 1999-03-13 | HU | Between Tiszakécske and Lakitelek | Level crossing accident | 5 | 1 |
| 1999-06-22 | SE | Veka | Level crossing accident | 5 | 0 |
| 1999-07-27 | PL | Owadow, Radom | Level crossing accident | 5 | 1 |
| 1999-10-05 | UK | Ladbroke Grove, Paddington, London | Train collision | 31 | 227 |
| 2000-01-04 | NO | Asta | Train collision | 19 | 18 |
| 2000-02-06 | DE | Brühl | Train derailment | 9 | 52 |
| 2000-06-04 | IT | Near Parma | Train collision | 5 | 1 |
| 2000-06-16 | NL | Voorst | Level crossing accident | 5 | 0 |
| 2001-01-03 | ES | Aguilas/Lorca Sutulena | Level crossing accident | 12 | 2 |
| 2001-02-28 | UK | Selby, Great Heck, North Yorkshire | Train collision with an obstacle | 10 | 82 |
| 2001-03-27 | BE | Pecrot | Train collision | 8 | 7 |
| 2002-02-20 | RO | Tecuci | Level crossing accident | 7 | 8 |
| 2002-02-26 | AT | Wampersdorf | Train collision | 6 | 17 |
| 2002-04-04 | PT | Ramal da Lousã - pk 29.9 | Train collision | 5 | 4 |
| 2002-05-10 | UK | Potters Bar | Train derailment | 7 | 32 |
| 2002-07-20 | IT | Messina, Sicily | Train derailment | 8 | 2 |
| 2002-10-02 | PT | Linha de Cascais - pk 0.69 (Lisboa) | Level crossing accident | 6 | 0 |
| 2002-11-06 | FR | Nancy | Fire in rolling stock | 12 | 0 |
| 2002-12-02 | PL | Malkinia | Level crossing accident | 5 | 4 |
| 2003-02-02 | FR | Hesdin | Level crossing accident | 5 | 0 |


| Date | Country | Place | Type | Fatalities | Injuries |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2003-05-08 | HU | Balatonszabadi-Sóstó, Siófok, Lake Balaton | Level crossing accident | 33 | 7 |
| 2003-06-03 | ES | Chinchilla/Navajuelos | Train collision | 19 | 6 |
| 2003-06-11 | DE | Between Schrozberg and Niederstetten, Baden-Württemberg | Train collision | 6 | 25 |
| 2003-06-24 | RO | Stroiesti | Level crossing accident | 5 | 4 |
| 2004-05-07 | ES | Hellin | Level crossing accident | 5 | 0 |
| 2004-11-06 | UK | Ufton Nervet | Level crossing accident | 7 | 8 |
| 2004-12-09 | CZ | Vrahovice | Level crossing accident | 5 | 3 |
| 2005-01-07 | IT | Bolognina di'Crevalcore | Train collision | 17 | 15 |
| 2005-02-12 | BE | Diepenbeek | Level crossing accident | 5 | 0 |
| 2006-05-26 | SK | Between Drienovska Nova Ves and Licartovce | Level crossing accident | 5 | 0 |
| 2006-08-21 | ES | Between León and Palencia. | Train derailment | 7 | 6 |
| 2006-10-11 | FR | Zoufftgen, between Bettembourg station and Thionville | Train collision | 6 | 2 |
| 2007-07-22 | RO | Tirgovista | Level crossing accident | 8 | 0 |
| 2008-02-28 | BG | Between the railway stations Kunino - Cherven Briyag | Fire in rolling stock | 9 | 10 |
| 2008-06-02 | FR | Between Perrignier and Thonon Les Bains | Level crossing accident | 7 | 3 |
| 2008-08-08 | CZ | Studenka station | Train collision with an obstacle | 7 | 22 |
| 2008-08-14 | HU | Between Vamosgyork and Gyongyos stations | Level crossing accident | 5 | 0 |
| 2009-02-21 | SK | Polomka | Level crossing accident | 12 | 20 |
| 2009-06-29 | IT | Viareggio | Train derailment | 32 | 27 |
| 2009-08-14 | RO | lasi | Level crossing accident | 13 | 3 |
| 2009-09-01 | PT | Baião | Level crossing accident | 5 | 2 |
| 2010-02-15 | BE | Buizingen station | Train collision | 18 | 83 (*) |

Table 3. Railway accidents in Europe with five or more fatalities 1990-2010.
(*) The number of fatalities and injuries in the Halle accident as per 23 February 2010. Figures can change.

## Annex 3 - List of national safety authorities

 and national investigation bodiesNational investigation body

| Austria | Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Innovation und Technologie Oberste Eisenbahnbehörde http://www.bmvit.gv.at | Bundesanstalt für Verkehr (VERSA) <br> Unfalluntersuchungstelle des Bundes, Fachbereich Schiene http://versa.bmvit.gv.at |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Belgium | Federale Overheidsdienst Mobiliteit en Vervoer Directoraat-generaal vervoer te Land Service Public fédéral Mobilité et Transports Direction générale Transport terrestre http://www.mobilit.fgov.be | Federale Overheidsdienst Mobiliteit en Vervoer Onderzoeksorgaan voor Ongevallen en Incidenten op het Spoor Service Public fédéral Mobilité et Transports Organisme d'enquête sur les Accidents et les Incidents ferroviaires http://www.mobilit.fgov.be |
| Bulgaria | Ministry of Transport - Railway Administration Executive Agency http://www.iaja.government.bg | Ministry of Transport - Railway Accident Investigation Unit http://www.mtitc.government.bg/ |
| Czech Republic | Drazni Urad - Rail Authority <br> http://www.du-praha.cz <br> http://www.ducr.cz | Drážní inspekce - Rail Safety Inspection office http://www.dicr.cz |
| Germany | Eisenbahn - Bundesamt (EBA) http://www.eba.bund.de | Bundesministerium für Verkehr, Bau und Stadtentwicklung Eisenbahn-Unfalluntersuchungsstelle http://www.bmvbs.de |
| Denmark | Trafikstyrelsen http://www.trafikstyrelsen.dk | Havarikommissonen for Civil Luftfart og Jernbane http://www.havarikommissionen.dk |
| Estonia | Estonian Technical Surveillance Authority http://www.tja.ee/?lang=en | Ministry of Economic Affairs and Communications Emergency Management Department http://www.mkm.ee |
| Greece | Hellenic Ministry of Transport and Communications Safety Authority for Rail Transport http://www.yme.gr | Hellenic Ministry of Transport and Communications Committee for Accident Investigation http://www.yme.gr |
| Spain | Agencia de Seguridad del Transporte Terrestre http://www.fomento.es | Ministerio de Fomento Comision de Investigación de Accidentes ferroviarios http://www.fomento.es |
| Finland | Finnish Transport Safety Agency TraFi http://www.trafi.fi (See also: www.rautatievirasto.fi) | Accident Investigation Board of Finland http://www.onnettomustutkinta.fi |
| France | Établissement Public de Sécurité Ferroviaire (EPSF) http://www.securite-ferroviaire.fr | Bureau d'Enquêtes sur les Accidents de Transport Terrestre http://www.bea-tt.equipement.gouv.fr |
| Hungary | National Transport Authority http://www.nkh.gov.hu | Transportation Safety Bureau http://www.kbsz.hu |

National investigation body

| Ireland | Railway Safety Commission http://www.rsc.ie | Railway Accident Investigation Unit http://www.raiu.ie |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Italy | Agenzia Nazionale per la Sicurezza delle Ferrovie http://www.mit.gov.it | Ministero delle Infrastrutture e dei Trasporti Railway Safety Commission http://www.infrastrutturetrasporti.it |
| Lithuania | Valstybinė geležinkelio inspekcija State Railway Inspectorate http://www.vgi.lt | Katastrofy tyrimu vadovas National Investigation Body http://www.transp.lt |
| Luxembourg | Ministère du Développement durable et des Infrastructures http://www.gouvernement.lu | Administration des Enquêtes Techniques http://www.mt.public.lu/transports/AET/ |
| Latvia | State Railway Technical Inspectorate (SRTI) http://www.vdzti.gov.lv | Transport Accident and Incident Investigation Bureau (TAIIB) http://www.taiib.gov.lv |
| Netherlands | Inspectie Verkeer en Waterstaat http://www.ivw.nl | The Dutch Safety Board http://www.safetyboard.nl |
| Norway | Norwegian Railway Inspectorate http://www.sjt.no | Accident Investigation Board Norway http://www.aibn.no |
| Poland | Urzad Transportu Kolejowego http://www.utk.gov.pl | Panstwowa Komisja Badania Wypadków Kolejowych (NIB) http://www.mi.gov.pl |
| Portugal | Instituto da Mobilidade e dos Transportes Terrestres http://www.imtt.pt | Gabinete de Investigação de Segurança e de Acidentes Ferroviários (GISAF) http://www.directorio.moptc.pt/index.asp?detalhe=58\&topcao=1 |
| Romania | Autoritatea Feroviara Romana (AFER) Romanian Railway Safety Authority http://www.afer.ro | Autoritatea Feroviara Romana (AFER) Romanian Railway Investigating Body http://www.afer.ro |
| Sweden | Transportstyrelsen http://www.transportstyrelsen.se | Statens haverikommission http://www.havcom.se |
| Slovenia | Public Agency of the Republic of Slovenia for Railway Transport http://www.azp.si | Ministry of Transport <br> Railway Accident and Incident Investigation Division http://www.mzp.gov.si |
| Slovakia | Railway Regulatory Authority (URZD) http://www.urzd.sk | Ministry of Transport Posts and Telecommunication http://www.telecom.gov.sk |
| United Kingdom | Office of Rail Regulation (ORR) http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk | Rail Accident Investigation Branch http://www.raib.gov.uk |
| Channel Tunnel | Channel Tunnel Safety Authority ctsa@orr.gsi.gov.uk Secrétariat général au Tunnel sous la Manche (SGTM) tunnelmanche@equipement.gouv.fr | See the relevant authority or body in France or the United Kingdom for the respective part of the Channel Tunnel |

## Key documents and references

Regulation (EC) No 881/2004 of the European Parliament and Council of 29 April 2004 establishing a European railway agency amended by Regulation (EC) No 1335/2008 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008.
Directive 2004/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 29 April 2004 on safety on the Community's railways and amending Council Directive 95/18/EC on the licensing of railway undertakings and Directive 2001/14/EC on the allocation of railway infrastructure capacity and the levying of charges for the use of railway infrastructure and safety certification. amended by

- Directive 2008/57/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 June 2008
- Directive 2008/110/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2008
- Commission Directive 2009/149/EC of 27 November 2009 as regards Common Safety Indicators and common methods to calculate accident costs.
Regulation (EC) No 91/2003 of the European Parliament and of the Council on rail transport statistics amended by
- Commission Regulation (EC) No 1192/2003 of 3 July 2003
- Commission Regulation (EC) No 1304/2007 of 7 November 2007
- Regulation (EC) No 219/2009 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009

The annual reports of all Member States' NIBs and NSAs submitted to the Agency.
All documents can be obtained through our web pages (http://www.era.europa.eu).

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[^0]:    (1) Figures according to CSI data as reported by the NSAs.

[^1]:    ( ${ }^{2}$ ) G Sonneck, 2003.
    ${ }^{\left({ }^{3}\right)}$ After the novel The sorrows of young Werther, by Goethe, where a suicide described in the book led to a series of copycat suicides throughout Europe.
    $\left({ }^{4}\right)$ Effects have been seen in the Berlin and Tokyo metros but so far not scientifically studied.

[^2]:    (5) European Commission's research programme.

[^3]:    ${ }^{(6)}$ Calculation based on corrected figures for 'Other accidents' for $B G$ and Collisions for DE, as explained in the text, using 4726 as total number of accidents 2006.

[^4]:    (7) CT is the abbreviation for Channel Tunnel.

[^5]:    ( ${ }^{9}$ ) CT is the abbreviation for Channel Tunnel.

[^6]:    $\left({ }^{(2)}\right.$ Investigation report, English translation, Summary on page 14.

[^7]:    ${ }^{(33)}$ Information given by the German NSA.

[^8]:    (14) Article 8(2) and (4), The Railway Safety Directive 2004/49/EC.
    $\left({ }^{15}\right)$ 'Evaluation of the way in which national safety rules are published and made available', ERA/REP/04-2009/SAF and ERA/INF/02-2009/SAF.
    ${ }^{(16)}$ ERA/REC/04-2009/SAF.

[^9]:    ${ }^{(17)}$ Information received in the peer reviews and impact assessments of the CSM on conformity assessment.

[^10]:    Design: GELLIS Communication
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